OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3400.10F

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND RADIOLOGICAL (CBR) DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS SUPPORTING OPERATIONAL FLEET READINESS

Ref: 
(a) Quadrennial Defense Review of May 97
(b) Proliferation: Threat and Response, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Nov 97 (NOTAL)
(c) Public Law 103-160
(d) Joint Service Agreement of Jul 94 (NOTAL)
(e) JCS Joint Vision 2010, Jun 96 (NOTAL)

1. Purpose. To assign Navy responsibility for establishing mission requirements and implementing policy governing Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) defense capabilities in association with the Department of Defense (DoD) Counterproliferation (CP) Initiative. This instruction has been substantially revised and should be reviewed in its entirety.

2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST S3400.10E (NOTAL).

3. Background. The end of the Cold War has reduced the threat of global nuclear conflict, but there is a growing threat from the aggressive proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. As addressed, in part, by reference (a), these weapons of mass destruction (WMD) present a grave and urgent challenge to the United States, our allies and troops abroad. For rogue nations, WMD are a ticket to power, stature and confidence in winning regional war. Reference (b) details this new danger and discusses important strategies on how to prevent, deter, and if necessary, respond to the threat. Reducing this serious risk is a national priority and necessitated enactment of reference (c) to ensure top level DoD oversight and appropriate Joint Service participation as outlined in reference (d). Within this context, the Secretary of Defense has directed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational Commanders in Chief and Military Departments and their Uniformed Services give greater emphasis to CP requirements and essential
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capabilities. In response to and support of these needs, this
directive articulates U.S. Navy CBR Defense policy and establishes
functional responsibilities to ensure the highest level of fleet
readiness and warfighting sustainability in a CBR environment.

4. Introduction

a. At least 20 countries, some hostile to the United States,
have or are in the process of developing WMD. Some terrorist
groups and several countries designated as "State Sponsors of
Terrorism" have also shown an interest in pursuing a CBR
capability. Others are strongly engaged in the sale or transfer of
associated CBR technology. These weapons are considered
"asymmetric threats," since adversaries will seek an advantage over
the U.S. by using unconventional approaches to circumvent or
undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities.
Unstable regimes, shifting power balances and terrorism are
prominent characteristics of the landscape today. In Joint Vision
2010, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff states that wider
access to advanced technology, including WMD, will increase the
number of actors with sufficient military power to upset existing
regional power balances.

b. The potential for catastrophic use of WMD is greater than
it has been in many decades. Aimed at responding to the
overwhelming power and superiority of the military infrastructure
of the U.S., either domestically or abroad, WMD could seriously
upset the execution and tempo of military operations. As an
example, contamination of logistics nodes, ports or other choke
points created during deployment and, force projection could delay
the initiation of military campaigns, increase the exposure and
vulnerability of troops and threaten the success of military
operations. It is imperative that U.S. forces are prepared to
operate effectively in WMD-contaminated environments while they are
simultaneously able to detect and identify threat agents, treat
casualties and remediate contaminated areas. The equipment,
tactics and procedures that enable a force to operate in a WMD
environment are collectively known as Passive Defense and represent
one of the seven major thrusts under DoD’s CP Initiative.

c. Enactment of reference (c) has changed the way DoD manages
and executes CBR Defense initiatives. Most notably, the Services
are required to consolidate all CBR Defense Research, Development,
Test, Evaluation and Acquisition (RDTE&A) funding into a single DoD
Program Objective Memorandum (POM). In addition, the Army, as DoD
Executive Agent (EA) for CBR Defense, is directed to coordinate and
integrate Services’ RDTE&A efforts. Reference (d) established a
formal process and provides a mechanism to oversee the Joint
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Program. In this
regard, the Navy functions as an equal partner to fully integrate
the Joint program and provide requisite focus to expedite priority fleet CBR Defense needs.

5. Policy

a. National Policy. The national policy with respect to WMD, is to prevent further proliferation and to reduce to the greatest extent possible the current inventory consistent with the national interest. The national goal with respect to chemical and biological warfare is a complete and verifiable world-wide ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. Until such a ban is achieved, however, and is consistent with existing treaties and international law, U.S. policy is to deter the use of chemical, toxin and biological weapons against U.S., allied and coalition forces by maintaining the capabilities to deny an enemy significant military advantage from their use. Deterrent capabilities shall include the ability to survive an initial attack and continue military operations in a contaminated environment.

b. Navy Policy. Consistent with national policy and strategy, the Navy shall maintain those CBR Defense capabilities required to support deterrence and enhance conventional warfighting through defensive means. The goal is to ensure that the use or threat of use of chemical or biological weapons or radiological contamination against a naval force will be a non-decisive factor in the outcome of any operation. The Navy shall implement its CBR Defense responsibilities in the spirit of reference (c) and within the framework delineated in reference (d).

6. Discussion

a. Joint Vision 2010 reference (e) calls for U.S. forces to have full spectrum dominance in any future conflict. Critical to achieving this dominance is the concept of full dimensional protection. It is envisioned that new sensors and information dissemination systems will be employed to detect chemical and biological attacks at ranges greater than those possible today, and to provide warning to specific units that may be affected. Enhanced deception and camouflage measures, increased individual and collective protection and a joint restoration capability against the effects are key elements of full dimensional protection. Reference (a) indicates that U.S. forces will use a full array of active and passive measures to establish multiple layers of protection against WMD in order to maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement.
b. Concerning the use of passive defense measures in response to paramilitary, covert and terrorist threats, three primary tenets for CBR Defense are germane: contamination avoidance, protection and decontamination. The preferred tactic is to avoid becoming contaminated by destroying the delivery system or maneuvering around the affected area whenever practical. Units must provide sufficient protection (individual and/or collective) to remain mission capable. Units must also be prepared to fight "dirty" (i.e., operate with some degree of contamination) for as long as possible before commencing decontamination procedures. Prudence dictates the need for operational commanders to assess risk to mission capability from the use or threatened use of CBR weapons.

7. **Applicability and Scope.** This instruction applies to all Navy activities afloat and the Navy shore base establishment for operations in a high threat or potentially contaminated environment. Sustainment of mission capability shall be accomplished through the development and employment of defensive methods and equipment utilizing the following elements:

   a. Operational Intelligence

   b. Operational Doctrine, Tactics and Training Procedures

   c. Detection, Identification, Warning, Reporting and Monitoring (Contamination Avoidance)

   d. Individual Protective Equipment

   e. Collective Protection

   f. Contamination Control/Decontamination Capabilities

   g. Casualty Handling, Medical Treatment and Prophylaxis

8. **Responsibilities**

   a. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments) (OPNAV N8) shall require that applicable resource sponsors identify and develop CBR Defense requirements and ensure these requirements are addressed during the Joint Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defense Program Objective Memorandum (POM) process. In addition, OPNAV N8 shall ensure applicable warfare sponsor Navy Operations and Maintenance funding is in place to support capabilities being developed and procured by the OSD-funded program. OPNAV N8 shall designate the Director, Surface Warfare Division (OPNAV N86) as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Executive Agent (EA) for CBR Defense. As EA, OPNAV N86 shall act as the organizational focus for other
Military Services, Joint Staff and DoD agencies. In conjunction with the appropriate OPNAV N8 divisions, OPNAV N86 shall oversee the formulation, integration and execution of policies, fiscal plans and programmatic requirements related to enhancing personnel protection and equipment and improving operational readiness and warfighting sustainability. Specifically, the EA shall coordinate with the applicable warfare sponsors to ensure:

(1) Navy requirements are identified and clearly articulated within the framework of references (c) and (d). This will require close liaison with the Assistant Secretary of the Navy staff, other CNO divisions, System Commands and Navy Laboratories responsible for CBR Defense programs.

(2) The CNO is represented at interservice and interagency CBR Defense meetings, working groups and conferences.

(3) Navy representatives participate in the development and review of Navy, Joint Staff and other service/agency policies, strategies, issue papers, studies, plans and programs pertaining to CBR Defense. This also includes direct participation in the annual revision of those documents required by references (c) and (d).

(4) Participation in the development and review of Joint Mission Need Statements (MNS) and Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) beneficial to Navy forces.

(5) Navy CBR Defense requirements are properly assessed to ensure there are adequate resources allocated to operate and maintain new equipment after it is procured and installed.

(6) That queries for information received from outside organizations such as the General Accounting Office and DoD Inspector General are forwarded to the proper Navy offices for reply.

b. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) (OPNAV N4) is the CBR Defense program sponsor for the Navy overseas shore base establishment and designated Advanced Base Functional Components (ABFCs). As such, OPNAV N4 shall identify overseas shore base and OPNAV N4 resource sponsored ABFC CBR Defense funding and equipment requirements in accordance with established priorities and policies for inclusion in the Joint NBC Defense POM. OPNAV N4 shall also establish appropriate training plans to ensure the survivability of ABFCs for which OPNAV N4 is the resource sponsor. In addition, OPNAV N4 is the Navy sponsor for radiacs initiatives.

c. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, and Personnel) (OPNAV N1) is responsible for analysis and validation of all manpower requirements generated by CBR Defense programs prior to inclusion in the Joint POM. OPNAV N1 shall assist OPNAV N8 in the
preparation of the Joint POM assessment by providing billet information on all overseas shore base personnel.

d. Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) is responsible for the collection, processing and dissemination of information pertaining to the foreign and terrorist CBR threat. DNI shall collate background material for specific countries or areas as necessary for the planning of operations. This information will be used in a variety of ways, including the development of equipment requirements and operational plans. The primary source document for naval CBW threat information is the annual Office of Naval Intelligence’s (ONI) “Naval Chemical and Biological Warfare Threat Assessment,” supplemented by messages as new information becomes available.

e. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations) (OPNAV N3/N5) is responsible for the review of Navy CBR Defense planning policy to ensure compliance with national guidance and for the formulation and presentation of Navy positions on CBR Defense matters, including treaties, to be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. OPNAV N3/N5, as the focal point for counter proliferation policy, shall coordinate, as required, on counter proliferation issues with the appropriate sponsors of related programs.

f. Director of Naval Medicine/Surgeon General of the Navy (OPNAV N093) is responsible for the development and implementation of all aspects of CBR casualty care. OPNAV N093 shall be represented in appropriate Joint Service forums and shall process medical Joint Service ORDs. OPNAV N093 shall validate Naval ORDs for CBR Defense medical equipment and shall coordinate their funding and procurement with the appropriate sponsor(s), Systems Commands and OPNAV N8.

g. Director of Naval Training (OPNAV N7) shall develop and implement individual basic, general and specific training for CBR Defense following the requirements of warfare sponsors and Fleet Commander in Chiefs (FLT/CINC). CBR Defense professional training shall be conducted in accordance with reference (d).

h. Director of Navy Test and Evaluation and Technology Requirements (OPNAV N091) is responsible for oversight of CBR Defense science and technology requirements and, test and evaluation programs in response to approved operational requirements and for liaison with other services in the development of Joint programs. The Navy shall maintain the capability to conduct test and evaluation in support of service unique requirements and Joint requirements when the Navy is the lead service. Department of the Navy Program Managers shall ensure the Navy is represented on appropriate working groups and that the information from these working groups is disseminated to the necessary research and development organizations.
i. Fleet Commanders in Chief (FLTCINCs) shall:

(1) Ensure every deployed unit is fully outfitted in accordance with its CBR Defense Allowance Equipment Lists (ADEL). This will include programming adequate operations and maintenance funding for logistic support.

(2) Ensure CBR Defense procedures and tactics are included in individual, team, unit and force training and exercise. Ensure all commands have access to CBR Defense training material and the equipment required for its support.

(3) Ensure Navy overseas shore bases in high threat areas have their full complement of CBR Defense equipment.

(4) Maintain a data base on inventory levels of CBR Defense equipment for all units, both ashore and afloat. This data shall be forwarded to OPNAV N4 for inclusion in the reports required by reference (c).

(5) Forward CBR Defense program recommendations and concerns to CNO in conjunction with the planning, programming and budgeting process. Recommendations should include overseas shore base outfitting requirements and priorities.

(6) Develop, coordinate and issue guidance to subordinate commanders in support of CNO policy to ensure preservation of mission capabilities in a CBR environment.

(7) If required, direct the re-distribution of CBR Defense assets as threat conditions change.

j. Commanders, Systems Commands (SYSCOMs) are responsible to their respective program sponsors for expediting RDTE&A initiatives. The Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (COMNAVSEASYSCOM) shall serve as the lead SYSCOM for CBR Defense programs. Each SYSCOM shall:

(1) Appoint and maintain a CBR Defense program manager to act as the central point of contact with OPNAV N8 and program sponsors and to provide technical management, direction, coordination, assessment and focus for implementing CBR Defense programs.

(2) Develop and implement joint acquisition plans in concert with the lead service, CNO sponsors and the FLTCINCs to ensure timely initial outfitting of designated forces with CBR Defense equipment and material. Coordination of ABFC initial outfitting shall be the responsibility of the respective ABFC lead systems command. The Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering
Command (COMNAVFACENGCOM) shall be responsible for coordinating the initial outfitting of Naval Construction Force units, Beach Groups and Navy shore activities. COMNAVSASYSCOM shall be responsible for the initial outfitting of Afloat units, Naval Special Warfare units and Explosive Ordnance Disposal units. COMNAVSASYSCOM shall assist, as required, in outfitting Military Sealift Command and U.S. Coast Guard vessels. Commander, Naval Air Systems Command shall be responsible for coordinating the initial outfitting of Navy and Marine Corps Aviation units.

(3) Provide timely funding and program documentation to support the planning, programming and budgeting process. Operation and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N), funding documentation shall be provided to the requirements sponsor. RDT&E and procurement documentation shall be provided to the Joint Service Material Group (JSMG) action officer at the lead SYS.COM.

(4) Establish contamination survivability design criteria for approval by CNO and ensure that these requirements are validated at the appropriate development milestones.

(5) Incorporate appropriate CBR Defense life cycle maintenance costs into logistic support plans.

(6) Develop methodologies to assess the feasibility and cost/benefit trade-offs associated with CBR Defense programs.

(7) Maintain assigned AELs for CBR Defense equipment.

k. Chief of Naval Research (CNR), is responsible for ensuring that technology base research in the CBR Defense area is coordinated with the other services' programs. CNR shall provide Navy representation on the appropriate joint technology base panels. CNR shall provide the Navy technology base input to the Joint reports and plans required in reference (c).

l. Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC), shall oversee and participate in the development and review of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for Navy and joint operations in a CBR environment.

m. Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) is responsible for the conduct of CBR Defense test and evaluation programs.

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